Archive for February, 2006

Stephen E. Flynn is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a retired Coast Guard officer. James M. Loy is a former deputy secretary of homeland security and commandant of the Coast Guard. They jointly wrote an Op-Ed piece in the NY Times today entitled A Port in the Storm Over Dubai.

The article is worth the read. I have pulled out a couple of key points in the excerpt below:

Americans are finally taking port security seriously . . .

Since the United States cannot own and control all of that system, we must work with our trade partners and foreign companies to ensure its security. A major step in that direction would be to construct a comprehensive global container inspection system that scans the contents of every single container destined for America’s waterfront before it leaves a port — rather than scanning just the tiny percentage we do now . . .

At the end of the day, America’s port security challenge is not about who is in charge of our waterfront. The real issue is that we are relying on commercial companies largely to police themselves. Both Congress and the White House should embrace a framework of “trust but verify,” in President Ronald Reagan’s phrase, based on real standards and real oversight. When it comes to the flow of goods around the planet, we need to know what’s in the box.

Full Story

Bruce Schneier, from Schneier on Security, wrote a very interesting piece in Wired this month, entitled U.S. Ports Raise Proxy Problem.

Below is a brief excerpt:

Most security works through proxies. We just don’t have the expertise to make decisions about airline security, police coverage and military readiness, so we rely on others. We all hope our proxies make the same decisions we would have, but our only choice is to trust — to rely on, really — our proxies.

Here’s the paradox: Even though we are forced to rely on them, we may or may not trust them. When we trust our proxies, we come to that trust in a variety of ways — sometimes through experience, sometimes through recommendations from a source we trust. Sometimes it’s third-party audit, affiliations in professional societies or a gut feeling. But when it comes to government, trust is based on transparency. The more our government is based on secrecy, the more we are forced to “just trust” it and the less we actually trust it . . .

Pull aside the rhetoric, and this is everyone’s point. There are those who don’t trust the Bush administration and believe its motivations are political. There are those who don’t trust the UAE because of its terrorist ties — two of the 9/11 terrorists and some of the funding for the attack came out of that country — and those who don’t trust it because of racial prejudices. There are those who don’t trust security at our nation’s ports generally and see this as just another example of the problem.

The solution is openness. The Bush administration needs to better explain how port security works, and the decision process by which the sale of P&O was approved. If this deal doesn’t compromise security, voters — at least the particular lawmakers we trust — need to understand that.

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Author: Khalid R. Al-Rodhan

Source: www.csis.org

Excerpt Below

There are no “bullet proof” security systems for energy facilities. Perhaps the weakest link in the Kingdom’s energy infrastructure is its estimated 11,092 miles of pipeline. It is impossible to protect all of this area, but as noted earlier, short of a large attack that damages these pipelines at multiple points, the resulting damage can be repaired relatively quickly. In addition, the building of redundant facilities may not be economically viable in the short-run, but given this asymmetric threat, it adds one layer of indirect security to vital energy structures.

Incidents like the attack on Abqaiq will happen, and the global energy market will react accordingly. The challenge for the Kingdom and all energy producing nations is to limit the physical damage to the facilities and the psychological impact on the global energy market. With the tightness of the current energy market and world energy consumption estimated to increase by more than 50% by 2025, the security of Saudi energy exports will play an increasingly more central role in the world’s economy.

The geostrategic and security risks facing the global energy market are all too clear. Stability in petroleum exporting regions is tenuous at best. Algeria, Iran, and Iraq all present immediate security problems, but recent experience has shown that exporting countries in Africa, the Caspian Sea, and South America are no more stable than their counterparts in Middle East. There has been pipeline sabotage in Nigeria, political posturing in Venezuela, alleged corruption in Russia, and civil unrest in Uzbekistan and other former Soviet Union countries.

Finally, energy security must also be understood in a broader context. In the near future, energy supply and transportation routes may be challenged by transnational terrorism and proliferation. It is equally possible that recent surges in the demand for oil, supply disruptions by hurricanes, the US refining capacity bottleneck, and the limited spare production capacity will continue to test the energy market in the mid to long-term.

Full Article

U.S. DAMS: IS SECURITY SEEPING THROUGH THE CRACKS

BY KEVIN G. COLEMAN

The complex watershed of North America should be considered a critical component of its infrastructure — and is therefore a potential terrorist target. In some cases, dams provide energy, supply drinking water and enable sporting and recreational opportunities. Currently, there are nearly 80,000 dams in the national inventory, most of which are privately owned. Less than 3 percent of those dams are owned by the Federal Government.

The Journal of the International Association of Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP) recently published a scenario planning methodology that evaluated a terrorist attack or attacks on small earthen high hazard dams. The report finds:

• The likelihood of an attack is increased because the likelihood of detection is diminished due to the remote location and the limited resources to monitor and patrol the potential 10,000 high hazard dam targets;
• The cost of such an attack would be minimal and does not require significant funding;
• Reconnaissance could be easily conducted without detection;
• The skill level required to carry out such an attack is not significant;
• The local economic impact would be significant;
• Multiple attacks in the United States would have significant psychological impact;
• The materials required to construct a bomb big enough to breach the dam are controlled, but available.

The consequences of a terrorist attack on a dam could be catastrophic — even the small earthen dams. Multiple simultaneous attacks on two or three of these structures could create mass casualties on a scale greater than on Sept. 11, 2001. Numerous federal and state agencies have conducted or planned risk assessments.

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Hazardous Seas

Maritime Sector Vulnerable to Devastating Terrorist Attacks

by JINSA Editorial Assistant Jonathan Howland

The recent attacks on the USS Cole (DDG-67) and the French supertanker MV Limburg offer a stark illustration of terrorist interest in maritime targets. U.S. intelligence officials have identified between 12 and 300 ships possibly owned and/or operated by al Qaeda. Upon his capture, the alleged al Qaeda mastermind behind the USS Cole attack, Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, reportedly confessed to planning future attacks against U.S. and British warships in the Straits of Gibraltar. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence agencies have described an increase in terrorist “chatter” regarding ships, port facilities, bridges, and SCUBA diving, reported Globalsecurity.org,

In its October 2003 terrorism report, London-based security consultants Aegis Defence Service (ADS) warned of the growing threat posed by the partnership between maritime piracy and marine terrorism.

If an explicit alliance between piracy and terrorism exists, as ADS and other intelligence officials believe, then the hijacking of merchant vessels at sea suddenly presents a daunting and multi-layered threat to global security and trade well beyond the “simple” threat of merchant piracy.

The nexus between piracy and terrorism affords terrorist groups a lucrative cash flow, access to deadly cargoes, and a means to launch spectacular attacks with the potential to wreak havoc on the global economy.

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The NY Times today had a very comprehensive article about the anatomy of a port and the related challenges in securing the vast critical infrastructure.

New York Times – Sunday February 26, 2006
By HASSAN M. FATTAH and ERIC LIPTON

To some American officials, the sprawling port along the Persian Gulf here, where steel shipping containers are stacked row after row as far as the eye can see, is a model for the post-9/11 world.

Fences enclose the port’s perimeter, which is patrolled by guards. Gamma-ray scanners peek inside containers to make sure they carry the clothing, aluminum, timber and other goods listed on shipping records. Radiation detectors search for any hidden nuclear material.

But those antiterrorism measures still fall far short of what is needed to ensure security, American government auditors and maritime experts say.

The scanning devices, for example, can check only a small fraction of the millions of containers that flow through here every year. The radiation detectors most likely would not pick up a key radioactive ingredient in a nuclear bomb, even if it was just modestly shielded. And the system that selects containers for inspection relies upon often-incomplete data.

In short, even at this model port, the security regimen set up in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, largely at the request of the United States government, is far from enough to address the vulnerabilities that make ports still such an attractive terrorist target.

It explains why so many port experts consider as misplaced the furor that erupted this week over whether Dubai Ports World, the government-owned company that operates this port, should be allowed to take over management of terminals in six American cities.

The trouble is not focused at the end of the line — the port terminal at the American shore. It is spread up and down the supply chain at critical points across the globe, no matter what the United States government and partners like United Arab Emirates have so far tried.

Security experts say the far more profound issue is the wide distance between what is needed for effective monitoring in terms of technology and programs versus what is on the ground.

Full Story

By Capt. Steve Alvarez, USA American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Feb. 24, 2006 – As it has for more than 200 years, the U.S. Coast Guard is carrying on its wartime service in operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom . . .

As part of Operation Noble Eagle, the Coast Guard protects more than 361 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline, Coast Guard officials said. The Coast Guard maintains the operations of U.S. ports and waterways by providing a secure environment for mariners, officials said. It achieves its missions with 39,000 active duty Coast Guard personnel, 8,100 Coast Guard Reservists, and 7,000 civilian Coast Guard personnel, according to Coast Guard personnel reports from 2005.

Today, Coast Guard officials said, the service’s homeland security role includes:

• Protecting ports, the flow of commerce, and the marine transportation system from terrorism;
• Maintaining maritime border security against illegal drugs, illegal aliens, firearms, and weapons of mass destruction;
• Ensuring rapid deployment and resupply to military assets, both by keeping Coast Guard units at a high state of readiness and by keeping marine transportation open for the transit of assets and personnel from other branches of the armed forces;
• Protecting against illegal fishing and indiscriminate destruction of living marine resources, prevention and response to oil and hazardous material spills — both accidental and intentional; and
• Coordinating efforts and intelligence with federal, state, and local agencies.

Full Press Release

Blog Tags: Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, Force Protection, Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Port Security

del.icio.us tags: antiterrorism, counterterrorism, force, protection, homeland, maritime, port, seaport, security, US Coast Guard, uscg

Oil Site Guards Blast Car Bombers

By HASAN JAMALI, Associated Press Writer

ABQAIQ, Saudi Arabia – Suicide bombers in explosives-laden cars attacked the world’s largest oil processing facility Friday, but were prevented from breaking through the gates when guards opened fire on them, causing the vehicles to explode, officials said.

The Saudi oil minister said the blast “did not affect operations” at the Abqaiq facility, denying an earlier report on Al-Arabiya television that the flow of oil was halted briefly after a pipeline was damaged.

The facility “continued to operate normally. Export operations continued in full,” the minister, Ali Naimi, said in a statement.

Full Story

Exceprt from Terrorism Monitor “Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda’s Next Target?”

Former CIA agent Robert Baer has considered the implications of terrorist
attacks on Saudi oil facilities, writing, “At the least, a moderate-to-severe attack on Abqaiq would slow average production there from 6.8 million barrels a day to roughly a million barrels for the first two months post-attack, a loss equivalent to approximately one-third of America’s current daily consumption of crude oil. Even as long as seven months after an attack, Abqaiq output would still be about 40 percent of pre-attack output, as much as four million barrels below normal—roughly equal to what all of the OPEC partners collectively took out of production during the devastating 1973 embargo” (see Robert Baer’s Sleeping with the Devil : How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude).

By John C.K. Daly (from Terrorism Monitor, February 23)

At a time of record-high oil prices, analysts are beginning to consider the implications of possible terrorist attacks on Middle Eastern oil facilities. The crown jewel of these facilities is Saudi Arabia’s oil production infrastructure. It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia possesses 261.9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves . . .

Terrorist attacks could be easily launched against onshore facilities and tankers. Over 60 percent of the world’s oil is shipped on 3,500 tankers through a small number of “chokepoints” including the Strait of Hormuz, which alone transits 13 million barrels of oil per day.

Al-Qaeda has already carried out maritime attacks on both warships and tankers. On October 6, 2002, the 299,364 DWT-ton French Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) tanker Limburg, carrying a cargo of 397,000 barrels of crude from Iran to Malaysia, was rammed by an explosives-laden boat off the port of Ash Shihr at Mukalla, 353 miles east of Aden. A crewman was killed and the double-hulled tanker was breached. The impact on the Yemeni economy was immediate, as maritime insurers tripled their rates . . .

Full Story

Blog Tags: Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, Force Protection, Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Port Security

del.icio.us tags: antiterrorism, counterterrorism, force, protection, homeland, maritime, port, seaport, security

Below is a nice list of websites with information relating to the Port and Maritime Industry.

• Port Industry Services Directory
  
  The American Association of Port Authorities’ comprehensive official directory and online registry of port-related services and equipment companies serving the port industry throughout the world.




• Shipping Guides LTD

  
  

  The Port Information Specialist




• Ports and Port Authorities




• Ports Harbours Marinas Worldwide




• Ports Around the World

Special Thanks to Nathan Estey and Michael Ravnitzky for compiling this list and suggesting its inclusion on this blog.