critical infrastructure security

WhisprWave® Boat Barrier

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Tsunami Uncovers Nuclear Reactor’s Thirst and Highlights Need for Boat Barriers
Incident Reinforces the Fact that Water Intakes Require Additional Security Measures to Protect them from Small Boat Attack

SUMMIT, N.J. — March 25, 2011 — Establishing, demarcating and physically securing maritime security zones with boat barriers around the cooling water intakes and waste water discharges for America’s 104 nuclear power plants is a necessary nuclear security upgrade, particularly in light of the recent Tsunami induced nuclear disaster in Japan.  The Tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011 created a domino effect that resulted in the Fukushima Ai Ichi Nuclear Power Plant’s reactors overheating due to the failure of its water-cooling system.  This incident put a global spotlight on a key vulnerability of the world’s nuclear reactors.

In light of the events of 9/11, security officials have been vocal about the need to improve critical infrastructure security. Boat barriers provide a visible physical deterrent for inadvertent recreational boat traffic from entering the security zone.  Boat barriers also establish a physical layer of security to deter, deny and delay terrorists utilizing water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED) delivered via a small boat.

There have been a number of small boat terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure assets. In October 2002, a 15-foot suicide small boat attacked the M/V Limburg, a French-flagged VLCC supertanker, off the coast of Yemen, disabling it and causing substantial explosion and fire related damage.  In October 2001, the Tamil Sea Tigers in Sri Lanka attacked the M/V Silk Pride, an oil tanker, with five small boats, also damaging and disabling this vessel. While refueling in the Port of Yemen in October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by an explosives laden small boat, which put a gaping hole in the side of the vessel. The small boat threat is real and the need for boat barriers to protect high value and critical infrastructure is clear.

The US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) strategy for the small boat threat is outlined in “The 2008 Small Vessel Security Strategy.”   The document outlines four primary threat types posed by small boats, the WBIED specific threat is outlined below:

“Use of small vessels as Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device – small, explosive-laden vessels used as “boat bombs” against another vessel, maritime critical infrastructure, or key resources”

A WBIED small boat attack resulting in the starvation of a nuclear reactor’s cooling supply is the scenario that is most likely considered, further supporting the logic that nuclear cooling intakes need to be protected by boat barriers.

On April 29, 2003 The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a revision to its Design Based Threat (DBT) (which describes the approximate size and attributes of the threats against which licensees must defend their facilities). These included the implementation of security measures to guard against waterborne attacks.  Waterborne attacks via small boat or otherwise are clearly on the NRC’s security roadmap.  The exact details of the plans are classified, but in light of the nuclear incident in Japan it is prudent for the US Nuclear Industry to “harden” its security infrastructure and implement robust, survivable and industry tested boat barriers, such as the WhisprWave® line of floating security barriers.

For more information, visit http://www.whisprwave.com or call Jonathan B. Smith at (908) 233-7503.

About Wave Dispersion Technologies, Inc.:

Wave Dispersion Technologies, Inc. is the world’s leading manufacturer and marketer of floating security barriers and floating wave attenuators, with over 50 product installations , on four continents, of its patented WhisprWave® line of innovative maritime solutions for the following markets: government, military, commercial and consumer. The Company has been developing the technology for 15 years and holds eight Domestic and International Patents for design and utility, with another 20 patents pending.

Contact:

Jonathan B Smith
Chief Operating Officer
Wave Dispersion Technologies, Inc.
908-233-7503
[email protected]
www.whisprwave.com

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This guide was developed to assist dam owners and operators in understanding the possible need for waterside barriers as part of their overall security plan. It provides them and security personnel with a very cursory level of information on barriers and their use, maintenance, and effectiveness—elements that must be carefully taken into account when selecting waterside barriers. The waterside barriers described here are systems or technologies designed to protect critical assets from attack by swimmers or the water-borne vessels commonly found on rivers or reservoirs.

The threat scenarios evaluated in the site vulnerability assessment form the basis for determining if a surface or subsurface barrier technology or barrier system is necessary.The interdiction and use of force policies associated with the use of waterside barriers must also be assessed and resolved as part of the security  plan. Considerations that influence the barrier  technology or barrier system selection in addition to their effectiveness include purchase, installation, maintenance, and replacement costs related to the sites specific environment and the training and staffing of site security forces.

Wave Dispersion Technologies, Inc. and International Golden Group PJSC are pleased to announce that their Joint Venture UAE company Golden Marine Systems (GMS) is exhibiting the WhisprWave® line of floating security barriers and boat barriers at IDEX 2011 in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

GMS was established in 2009 with offices in Abu Dhabi and a local manufacturing facility in Mussafa, ICAD (I) to manufacture components of the WhisprWave® floating security barriers and boat barriers. GMS is an example of a successful joint venture that meets the foreign direct investment objectives of the UAE government and the business development needs of an innovative US manufacturer.

Please stop by booth 05-A30 @ IDEX 2011 to discuss how Golden Marine Systems can help to meet your maritime security needs.

Golden Marine Systems IDEX 2011

Golden Marine Systems – Floating Security Barriers – Brochure

Shortly following the tragic events of September 11, 2011, eleven professional and technical organizations and federal agencies formed The Infrastructure Security Partnership (TISP) as a non-profit partnership to be a national asset faciliatating dialogue on domestic infrastructure security and offering sources of technical support and sources for comment on public policy, realted to the secuirty of the nation’s built environment.

TISP is a national leader in infrastructure security and resiliency with a diverse membership supporting the nation’s economy and well being of its people.  TISP pledges to lead public-and private-sector collaboration that advances the practive and policies of infrastructure security and resiliency to sustain the nation’s resources and its ability to efficiently restore infrastructure when disrupted by any hazard.

Source: www.tisp.org

NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY COUNCIL - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE

Executive Summary

Business and society operate in an increasingly complex world marked by interconnection and interdependence across global networks. This complexity requires that owners and operators of critical infrastructures manage their operational risks in an all-hazards environment across the full spectrum of prevention, protection, response, recovery, and reconstitution activities. Most leaders have come to understand that protection of critical infrastructures is an important component of managing infrastructure risk, but other elements must also be considered, including resiliency. The expanding risk landscape demands a continual reevaluation of the roles of governments and businesses in ensuring the delivery of basic infrastructure services. These factors have increased the focus on resilience as an important strategy to help mitigate the multitude of risks facing owners and operators of critical infrastructures in the United States.

Last year, the Council examined the role of the public-private partnership in achieving critical infrastructure protection. That study noted that resilience has become an important dimension of the critical infrastructure protection mission and a key element of the value proposition for partnership with the government because it recognizes both the need for security and the reality of business operations. Because of the importance of resilience in infrastructure security, the Council launched this study to better define resilience in the context of critical infrastructures, clarify appropriate public- and private- sector roles, and examine what steps government and industry should take to best integrate resilience and protection into a comprehensive risk-management strategy.

Infrastructure resilience is about “delivering the goods” regardless of disruptive events that may occur. Although each critical infrastructure sector operates differently, a common definition of infrastructure resilience is needed for public policies and governance to be effective. Toward this end, the Council has developed the following definition based on discussions with executives and security experts across many sectors.

Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.

The NIAC recognizes that protection and resilience are not opposing concepts; they represent complementary and necessary elements of a comprehensive risk management strategy. The strong foundation developed for infrastructure protection continues to be an essential and vital part of risk management in all critical infrastructure sectors. What is needed now is a strengthening of resilience policies and strategies to build on the successes of the infrastructure protection efforts.

Infrastructure resilience is closely aligned with the way modern businesses manage strategic, operational, and financial risks and the way governments absorb societal shocks from disasters. For companies, the need to be resilient is driven by competitive market forces because customers and shareholders expect products and services to be delivered despite disruptive events. In certain sectors, especially those that operate in highly dynamic threat environments and manage extensive global value chains, leading companies have incorporated risk management into their corporate culture and many consider it a competitive differentiator. This sophisticated risk management includes protection, which is a critical component of risk management in asset-based sectors.

Yet market forces alone are insufficient to ensure that sectors are resilient. Not all enterprises are driven to focus on managing operational and strategic risks and the resilience of individual companies does not guarantee the resilience of the entire sector. Small- and medium-size companies, for example, may lack sophisticated continuity of operations plans and may not have the resources to continually monitor the risk landscape. In addition, the resilience of publicly-owned infrastructures, such as many roads and dams, is not governed by market forces. At the federal level, the government is responsible for providing for public security, health, and safety. Maintaining delivery of critical infrastructure services is a significant component of that mission and ensuring the resilience of critical infrastructures in the face of all types of hazards should be evaluated, even when there is no business case for CIKR owner and operator investment and action.

Full Report

For the second year in a row, President Obama has designated December as Critical Infrastructure Protection Month, stating: “My Administration is committed to delivering the necessary information, tools, and resources to areas where critical infrastructure exists in order to maintain and enhance its security and resilience.”

Because most U.S. critical infrastructure is privately owned, this federal effort is an unprecedented network of public-private partnerships involving thousands of stakeholders in the United States and abroad.
President Obama’s proclamation calls upon “the people of the United States to recognize the importance of protecting our Nation’s resources and to observe this month with appropriate events and training to enhance our national security and resilience.”

Through the leadership of the Office of Infrastructure Protection, DHS is honoring President Obama’s proclamation with a host of initiatives and resources, including the expansion of essential programs such as the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, bombing prevention programs and tools, commercial facilities training and resources, risk management and analysis, contingency planning and incident management, and much more.

Throughout the month of December, the Office of Infrastructure Protection will be providing updates, comprehensive overviews, and tons of helpful information.  Please visit us at http://www.dhs.gov/criticalinfrastructure to sign up for updates and to learn more about what we’re doing at DHS to protect the critical infrasture that ensures the security, welfare, and safety of your community.

– Guest Blog from the Office of Infrastructure Protection, External Communications, DHS

Published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.

The Blog @ Homeland Security

Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure

Highlights of GAO-06-91, a report to Congressional Requesters

What GAO Recommends

The three DHS components GAO studied varied considerably in their progress in developing a sound risk management framework for homeland security responsibilities. The varied progress reflects, among other things, each component’s organizational maturity and the complexity of its task (see table below). The Coast Guard, which is furthest along, is the component of longest standing, being created in 1915, while IAIP came into being with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. IAIP, which has made the least progress, is not only a new component but also has the most complex task—addressing not just ports but all types of infrastructure. The Coast Guard and ODP have a relatively robust methodology in place for assessing risks at ports; IAIP is still developing its methodology and has had several setbacks in completing the task. All three components, however, have much left to do. In particular, each component is limited in its ability to compare and prioritize risks. The Coast Guard and ODP can do so within a port but not between ports; IAIP has not demonstrated that it can do so either within or between all infrastructure sectors.

Each component faces many challenges in making further progress. Success will depend partly on continuing to improve various technical and management processes that are part of risk management. For example, obtaining better quality data from intelligence agencies would help DHS components estimate the relative likelihood of various types of threats—a key element of assessing risks. In the longer term, progress will depend increasingly on how well risk management is coordinated across agencies, because current approaches in many ways are neither consistent nor comparable. Also, weaving risk-based data into the annual budget cycle of program review will be important. Supplying the necessary guidance and coordination is what the Department of Homeland Security was set up to do and, as the Secretary of Homeland Security has stated, what it now needs increasingly to address. This is a key issue for the department as it seeks to identify relative risks and take appropriate actions related to the nation’s homeland security activities.

Progress in Risk Management Is Affected by Organizational Maturity and Complexity of Risk Management Task

DHS component and degree of progress
United States Coast Guard (USCG): Furthest along in developing a risk management framework
Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP): not as far along, but recent steps are good
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP): least far along

Organizational characteristics
USCG: Long-standing component; risk management activity began before September 11 attacks
ODP: Relatively new component transferred from Department of Justice to Department of Homeland Security in 2003
IAIP: New component established with creation of Department of Homeland Security

Complexity of risk management task
USCG: Difficult – must be able to prioritize risks not only within ports but among them
ODP: Difficult – must be able to prioritize risks not only within ports but among them
IAIP: Extremely difficult – must be able to prioritize risks not only among ports but among all sectors of the nation’s critical infrastructure

Resources

• Executive Summary
• Full Report

Blog Tags: Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, Force Protection, Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Port Security