energy security

WhisprWave® Boat Barrier

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Tsunami Uncovers Nuclear Reactor’s Thirst and Highlights Need for Boat Barriers
Incident Reinforces the Fact that Water Intakes Require Additional Security Measures to Protect them from Small Boat Attack

SUMMIT, N.J. — March 25, 2011 — Establishing, demarcating and physically securing maritime security zones with boat barriers around the cooling water intakes and waste water discharges for America’s 104 nuclear power plants is a necessary nuclear security upgrade, particularly in light of the recent Tsunami induced nuclear disaster in Japan.  The Tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011 created a domino effect that resulted in the Fukushima Ai Ichi Nuclear Power Plant’s reactors overheating due to the failure of its water-cooling system.  This incident put a global spotlight on a key vulnerability of the world’s nuclear reactors.

In light of the events of 9/11, security officials have been vocal about the need to improve critical infrastructure security. Boat barriers provide a visible physical deterrent for inadvertent recreational boat traffic from entering the security zone.  Boat barriers also establish a physical layer of security to deter, deny and delay terrorists utilizing water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED) delivered via a small boat.

There have been a number of small boat terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure assets. In October 2002, a 15-foot suicide small boat attacked the M/V Limburg, a French-flagged VLCC supertanker, off the coast of Yemen, disabling it and causing substantial explosion and fire related damage.  In October 2001, the Tamil Sea Tigers in Sri Lanka attacked the M/V Silk Pride, an oil tanker, with five small boats, also damaging and disabling this vessel. While refueling in the Port of Yemen in October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by an explosives laden small boat, which put a gaping hole in the side of the vessel. The small boat threat is real and the need for boat barriers to protect high value and critical infrastructure is clear.

The US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) strategy for the small boat threat is outlined in “The 2008 Small Vessel Security Strategy.”   The document outlines four primary threat types posed by small boats, the WBIED specific threat is outlined below:

“Use of small vessels as Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device – small, explosive-laden vessels used as “boat bombs” against another vessel, maritime critical infrastructure, or key resources”

A WBIED small boat attack resulting in the starvation of a nuclear reactor’s cooling supply is the scenario that is most likely considered, further supporting the logic that nuclear cooling intakes need to be protected by boat barriers.

On April 29, 2003 The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a revision to its Design Based Threat (DBT) (which describes the approximate size and attributes of the threats against which licensees must defend their facilities). These included the implementation of security measures to guard against waterborne attacks.  Waterborne attacks via small boat or otherwise are clearly on the NRC’s security roadmap.  The exact details of the plans are classified, but in light of the nuclear incident in Japan it is prudent for the US Nuclear Industry to “harden” its security infrastructure and implement robust, survivable and industry tested boat barriers, such as the WhisprWave® line of floating security barriers.

For more information, visit http://www.whisprwave.com or call Jonathan B. Smith at (908) 233-7503.

About Wave Dispersion Technologies, Inc.:

Wave Dispersion Technologies, Inc. is the world’s leading manufacturer and marketer of floating security barriers and floating wave attenuators, with over 50 product installations , on four continents, of its patented WhisprWave® line of innovative maritime solutions for the following markets: government, military, commercial and consumer. The Company has been developing the technology for 15 years and holds eight Domestic and International Patents for design and utility, with another 20 patents pending.

Contact:

Jonathan B Smith
Chief Operating Officer
Wave Dispersion Technologies, Inc.
908-233-7503
[email protected]
www.whisprwave.com

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Source: www.ensec.org

Terrorists learning from pirates to operate in the maritime realm

Terrorist groups operating in the maritime realm is not a new concern; several terrorist organizations have—or have had—well-developed abilities to attack targets at sea. In addition to al-Qa’ida’s previously mentioned attacks on the USS Cole, the M/V Limburg, and the USS Firebolt, Abu Sayaaf in the Philippines is responsible for the largest maritime terrorist event ever to have occurred: the 2004 bomb attack on SuperFerry 14, which killed over 100 people. And the (currently non-operational) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launched several successful suicide missions against maritime targets from their bases in Sri Lanka.

Not all terrorist groups have mastered maritime operations, but many currently seek to do so, in parts of the world that have been relatively free of maritime terrorist activity. Of the greatest concern is Somalia and the impact this could have on shipping in the region if terrorist attacks on vessels were to occur more frequently. Additionally important are recent activities of splinter groups associated with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. For example, in 2008 militants from the Niger Delta region attacked the MT Meredith, a tanker carrying 4,000 tons of diesel fuel, and kidnapped a Romanian crew-member (released a day later). The militants, believed to be associated with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), succeeded in dynamiting the ship’s engine and severely disabling the vessel. While the MEND and other related “copycat” groups have been known to attack and blow up oil pipelines, this was the first time such an attack has occurred at sea and may portend an increasing concern for the future.

Finally, the July 2010 attack on the Japanese-owned VLCC (very large crude carrier) M Star in the Strait of Hormuz is a worrisome development for the world’s critical energy trade. The damage to the tanker—believed to be caused by “homemade explosives” aboard a dinghy [small boat attack / small boat threat] —was not considered serious, but the news instantly fanned worries about shipping security, as it was the first attack of its kind in the critically strategic strait. Responsibility for what they called a “suicide attack” was claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an al-Qa’ida affiliated group.

Full Story

Wave Dispersion Technologies, Inc. and International Golden Group PJSC are pleased to announce that their Joint Venture UAE company Golden Marine Systems (GMS) is exhibiting the WhisprWave® line of floating security barriers and boat barriers at IDEX 2011 in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

GMS was established in 2009 with offices in Abu Dhabi and a local manufacturing facility in Mussafa, ICAD (I) to manufacture components of the WhisprWave® floating security barriers and boat barriers. GMS is an example of a successful joint venture that meets the foreign direct investment objectives of the UAE government and the business development needs of an innovative US manufacturer.

Please stop by booth 05-A30 @ IDEX 2011 to discuss how Golden Marine Systems can help to meet your maritime security needs.

Golden Marine Systems IDEX 2011

Golden Marine Systems – Floating Security Barriers – Brochure

The threat of terrorism resides at the nexus of intent and capability. In judging whether terrorists are likely to strike a particular target, we consider whether a successful strike will fulfill their intent but also whether executing a successful strike is within their capabilities. The attacks on September 11th showed the jihadists movement intent to attack the United States. It also demonstrated the kind of capabilities they can achieve in order to carry out their intent. Planning and reconnaissance phases lasted years. The attackers learned how to fly and how to engage in close quarter combat. They used these capabilities to hijack aircraft and turn them into guided missiles. Given the stated intent from al Qaeda and affiliated organizations to cause this level of destruction again, we should assume that they are looking for other opportunities to use our own infrastructure against us.

Intent

Jihadist groups including al Qaeda and affiliated organizations have articulated goals including:

A successful attack on an LNG tanker could fulfill all these intentions. Transporting large quantities of this hazardous substance through inland waterways to urban terminals presents the sort of target that could kill large numbers of American citizens, destroy our economic centers, and eliminate critical assets for importing energy. As our Providence report concluded, a precisely timed assault against a slow moving LNG carrier transiting within close proximity to densely populated areas could cause death and destruction far greater than 9/11. In addition, it could bring global trade to a halt for a prolonged period of time and deprive us of a growing source of energy for both power generation and wintertime heat.

Capabilities

Al Qaeda and related groups have demonstrated an ability to operate undetected in the US. Even since 9-11, terrorist groups have maintained a presence in the US despite our attempts to expose them. A 2005 report indicated that the FBI has over 1000 Full Field Investigations underway against al Qaeda alone. Our border control efforts do little to deter illegal crossing into the United States, which continues to be a commonplace activity.

Weapons and other capabilities needed to conduct an attack on an LNG carrier can be readily obtained in the US, according to US Government reports. A variety of boats and scuba gear can be easily procured. General Aviation aircraft can easily be rented or stolen at numerous small airports throughout the United States. Explosives are readily available, both fertilizer based weapons, which can be procured without a license, and commercial explosives, which are frequently stolen and sold on the black market. Large caliber rockets can be obtained on the international gray arms market. Few containers entering the United States are inspected by US Customs and can deliver shipments of nefarious goods and materials needed to complete any mission.

Full Article

The final scene in Syriana portrays a disaffected youth in the Middle East choosing Jihad.

This scene highlights the need for maritime security zones and floating security barriers to protect high value critical infrastructure from a small boat terrorist attack utilizing an Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

If the democratic surge in Egypt causes Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood to join the government, the toughest counterterrorism challenge ahead may come as U.S. officials are forced to work with this new government, seeking common ground against terrorist enemies even if the Islamic faction tries to distance Egypt from its neighbor, Israel; American political leaders have long fused counterterror aims with support for Israel, but even those Arabs — let alone more religious Islamist organizations such as the Brotherhood — who oppose al Qaeda and jihadism, insist on the distinction between terrorism, on the one hand, and what they consider as a legitimate resistance to continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands; contending with an altered Arab world landscape with rising Islamic factions could thus force hard choices on the United States.

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Source: www.lngfacts.org

The LNG Industry provides the appropriate security, planning, prevention and mitigation in close coordination with local, state, and federal authorities, including the United States Coast Guard. These measures significantly reduce risks from intentional events such as terrorist attacks.

The U.S. Coast Guard determines the suitability of a waterway to transport LNG safely; creates safety and security rules for each specific port; works with terminal and ship operators and host port authorities to ensure that policies and procedures conform to required standards; and works with operators to conduct emergency response drills; has the authority to receive background checks of crews; conducts ship searches; and requires the use of Sea Marshals (specially trained and armed U.S. Coast Guard personnel).Companies tightly control access to facilities through gated security and continuous surveillance monitoring. All personnel undergo identity and background checks. Supplies and equipment are inspected before entering facilities.

Federal regulations authorize safety zones to safeguard carriers, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities. These zones are determined on a case-by-case basis as part of a facility security plan to minimize vulnerability. The regulations requiring exclusion zones around LNG facilities ensure people and property are protected.

Risks resulting from intentional events such as terrorist attacks, can be greatly reduced with the appropriate security, planning, mitigation, and prevention. The LNG industry has these precautions in place.

Full Article

By Gal Luft

Source: www.politico.com

Oil Site Guards Blast Car Bombers

By HASAN JAMALI, Associated Press Writer

ABQAIQ, Saudi Arabia – Suicide bombers in explosives-laden cars attacked the world’s largest oil processing facility Friday, but were prevented from breaking through the gates when guards opened fire on them, causing the vehicles to explode, officials said.

The Saudi oil minister said the blast “did not affect operations” at the Abqaiq facility, denying an earlier report on Al-Arabiya television that the flow of oil was halted briefly after a pipeline was damaged.

The facility “continued to operate normally. Export operations continued in full,” the minister, Ali Naimi, said in a statement.

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Exceprt from Terrorism Monitor “Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda’s Next Target?”

Former CIA agent Robert Baer has considered the implications of terrorist
attacks on Saudi oil facilities, writing, “At the least, a moderate-to-severe attack on Abqaiq would slow average production there from 6.8 million barrels a day to roughly a million barrels for the first two months post-attack, a loss equivalent to approximately one-third of America’s current daily consumption of crude oil. Even as long as seven months after an attack, Abqaiq output would still be about 40 percent of pre-attack output, as much as four million barrels below normal—roughly equal to what all of the OPEC partners collectively took out of production during the devastating 1973 embargo” (see Robert Baer’s Sleeping with the Devil : How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude).

By John C.K. Daly (from Terrorism Monitor, February 23)

At a time of record-high oil prices, analysts are beginning to consider the implications of possible terrorist attacks on Middle Eastern oil facilities. The crown jewel of these facilities is Saudi Arabia’s oil production infrastructure. It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia possesses 261.9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves . . .

Terrorist attacks could be easily launched against onshore facilities and tankers. Over 60 percent of the world’s oil is shipped on 3,500 tankers through a small number of “chokepoints” including the Strait of Hormuz, which alone transits 13 million barrels of oil per day.

Al-Qaeda has already carried out maritime attacks on both warships and tankers. On October 6, 2002, the 299,364 DWT-ton French Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) tanker Limburg, carrying a cargo of 397,000 barrels of crude from Iran to Malaysia, was rammed by an explosives-laden boat off the port of Ash Shihr at Mukalla, 353 miles east of Aden. A crewman was killed and the double-hulled tanker was breached. The impact on the Yemeni economy was immediate, as maritime insurers tripled their rates . . .

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Blog Tags: Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, Force Protection, Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Port Security

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