think tank

There is a need to protect military ships from attack by explosive laden watercraft traveling at high rates of speed. Such explosive laden watercraft may include commercial power boats, small military craft and pleasure craft. These boats are generally less than forty feet in length, have a weight of around 10,000 pounds and travel at speeds of up to 52 knots. The small watercraft threat may be defined as watercraft which have a kinetic energy threshold of approximately 1,000,000 lb-ft and are capable of achieving a kinetic energy of 2,000,000 lb-ft.

Plans were put in place to prevent small-boat terrorist attacks against Navy ships, such as the USS Cole (DDG 67) incident in the Port of Aden, Yemen. Post-Cole, the Navy increased its physical security posture on all assets to include those homeported here in the San Diego bay. Navy policy now mandates certain physical security requirements be in place to protect these assets. On October 27, 2000, in response to that attack, Secretary of the Navy Danzig directed the establishment of a Department of the Navy Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Task Force to review force protection procedures and identify further actions that could be taken to enhance the force protection posture of Naval forces worldwide. By early November 2000, each of the Fleet commanders had identified near-, medium-, and long-term steps to boost AT/FP measures.

Several of the Fleets’ responses identified the need for enhanced waterside security measures and systems, including boat barriers. These and other AT/FP recommendations were validated by the OPNAV staff, and some of these requirements – including those related to boat barriers – were provided to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS] Law Enforcement and Physical Security Department, at the time known as NCIS Code 24, for execution. Code 24 and contractor personnel conducted site surveys starting in late 2000 and worked to identify available options for boat barriers.

Two types of Boat Barriers were available as of 2003. The DUNLOP Ship Fender Barrier System is an 8 foot diameter rubber inflatable fenders at a cost of $951 per linear foot. The Port Security Barrier (PSB) is a pontoon with nylon net catch system at a cost of $800 per linear foot.

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The threat of terrorism resides at the nexus of intent and capability. In judging whether terrorists are likely to strike a particular target, we consider whether a successful strike will fulfill their intent but also whether executing a successful strike is within their capabilities. The attacks on September 11th showed the jihadists movement intent to attack the United States. It also demonstrated the kind of capabilities they can achieve in order to carry out their intent. Planning and reconnaissance phases lasted years. The attackers learned how to fly and how to engage in close quarter combat. They used these capabilities to hijack aircraft and turn them into guided missiles. Given the stated intent from al Qaeda and affiliated organizations to cause this level of destruction again, we should assume that they are looking for other opportunities to use our own infrastructure against us.

Intent

Jihadist groups including al Qaeda and affiliated organizations have articulated goals including:

A successful attack on an LNG tanker could fulfill all these intentions. Transporting large quantities of this hazardous substance through inland waterways to urban terminals presents the sort of target that could kill large numbers of American citizens, destroy our economic centers, and eliminate critical assets for importing energy. As our Providence report concluded, a precisely timed assault against a slow moving LNG carrier transiting within close proximity to densely populated areas could cause death and destruction far greater than 9/11. In addition, it could bring global trade to a halt for a prolonged period of time and deprive us of a growing source of energy for both power generation and wintertime heat.

Capabilities

Al Qaeda and related groups have demonstrated an ability to operate undetected in the US. Even since 9-11, terrorist groups have maintained a presence in the US despite our attempts to expose them. A 2005 report indicated that the FBI has over 1000 Full Field Investigations underway against al Qaeda alone. Our border control efforts do little to deter illegal crossing into the United States, which continues to be a commonplace activity.

Weapons and other capabilities needed to conduct an attack on an LNG carrier can be readily obtained in the US, according to US Government reports. A variety of boats and scuba gear can be easily procured. General Aviation aircraft can easily be rented or stolen at numerous small airports throughout the United States. Explosives are readily available, both fertilizer based weapons, which can be procured without a license, and commercial explosives, which are frequently stolen and sold on the black market. Large caliber rockets can be obtained on the international gray arms market. Few containers entering the United States are inspected by US Customs and can deliver shipments of nefarious goods and materials needed to complete any mission.

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Source: www.usni.org

Source: www.dhs.gov

Background

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recognizes the need to address the threats that small vessels pose to the United States. Small vessels are categorized as any watercraft of less than 300 gross tons and used for recreational or commercial purposes, regardless of method of propulsion. Small vessels include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, and any other personal or commercial vessels involved in U.S. or foreign voyages. With 95,000 miles of shoreline, 300,000 square miles of waterways, 360 ports of call, 12,000 marinas, and an estimated 17 million small vessels presently operating in U.S. waters, it is extremely difficult to distinguish friend from foe.

DHS has identified four scenarios of gravest concern regarding the potential use of small vessels in terrorist-related activities: using a small vessel (1) as a waterborne improvised explosive device, (2) to smuggle weapons (including weapons of mass destruction) into the United States, (3) to smuggle terrorists into the United States, and (4) as a waterborne platform for conducting an attack.

These four scenarios are based on terrorist acts that have involved small vessels. For example, in October 2000, Al-Qaeda attacked the USS Cole by navigating an explosive-laden small boat alongside the destroyer as it was refueling pier side at the port of Aden in Yemen. Seventeen U.S. Navy sailors were killed in the explosion.

The USS Cole with a large hole in her left side after being struck by an Al-Qaeda waterborne improvised explosive device.

In October 2002, Al-Qaeda directed an attack by an explosive- laden small boat against the French oil tanker M/V Limburg off the coast of Yemen. The attack resulted in a large oil spill and fires on board the tanker, and killed one and injured four crew members.

In a recent surge of international piracy, terrorists have used small vessels to hijack cruise ships, tankers, and other vessels. In 2007, 206 acts of piracy were committed, and 76 others attempted. In September 2008, Somali pirates used three small vessels to surround and seize the MV Faina, which was carrying 33 Russian T-72 tanks and other weapons and ammunition. The captain of the vessel died during the assault, and the pirates demanded $35 million for the release of the ship and the crew.

In November 2008, terrorists hijacked a Pakistani fishing boat, killing the captain and crew. The terrorists then sailed the boat to Mumbai, India, where they went ashore in small inflatable boats and carried out an attack that killed more than 170 people and held India’s financial capital hostage for 3 days.

As these events demonstrate, the threat posed by terrorists operating small vessels is daunting.

In June 2007, the DHS National Small Vessel Security Summit, held in Arlington, Virginia, brought together approximately 300 small vessel maritime stakeholders and top federal, state, and local government officials to share concerns about small vessel operations, safety, and security. Using recommendations from the National Summit, risk management principles, and previous U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) analyses of small vessel threats, a DHS working group developed the Small Vessel Security Strategy, which DHS published in April 2008, to address the risks of small vessels to national security.

The overall objective of the Small Vessel Security Strategy is to close security gaps and enhance the small vessel security environment. The Strategy lists four major goals for achieving small vessel security:

Findings

Overall, the department has made progress, but more remains to be done to provide effective guidance and operate effective programs to address small vessel threats. The Strategy addresses two desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy as it defines the problem, and uses risk assessments to analyze the threats. However, the Strategy only partially addresses the remaining four characteristics. It partially addresses elements such as strategic priorities and milestones, and roles and responsibilities of state and local sectors, but it does not address performance measures, associated costs or human capital, or accountability and oversight frameworks.

Additionally, critical programs intended to support small vessel security may not be operating effectively. Although the department recognizes the need to raise public awareness and take action to mitigate the risk of small vessel threats, its approach was hindered because its components are not fully integrated. As a result, the nation’s ports, waterways, and maritime borders remain vulnerable to small vessel threats. The department partially concurred with our recommendation that it address the missing elements in its strategy. The department nonconcurred with our recommendation that it evaluate the effectiveness of the programs it intends to use to meet the strategy’s goals.

Full Audit Report

By Gal Luft

Source: www.politico.com

Source: www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com

In six Arab-Muslim states in the Middle East, six — Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen — more than 50 percent of the citizenry are under the age of 25; in other six states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates — the “under 25s” make up between 35 to 47 percent of the population; in Yemen, some 75 percent of the population is under 30, and the poverty rate exceeds 45 percent; in Egypt, some 66 percent of the population is under 30, while fully half the country’s 80 million citizens lives on less than $2 per day; since 1980, the Arab world has experienced the highest rate of [population] growth of any region in the world; during the same period, the Arab economies have been sputtering, creating far too few jobs

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CRS Report for Congress

Summary

A key challenge for U.S. policy makers is prioritizing the nation’s maritime security activities among a virtually unlimited number of potential attack scenarios. While individual scenarios have distinct features, they may be characterized along five common dimensions: perpetrators, objectives, locations, targets, and tactics. In many cases, such scenarios have been identified as part of security preparedness exercises, security assessments, security grant administration, and policy debate. There are far more potential attack scenarios than likely ones, and far more than could be meaningfully addressed with limited counter-terrorism resources.

There are a number of logical approaches to prioritizing maritime security activities. One approach is to emphasize diversity, devoting available counter- terrorismresourcestoabroadlyrepresentativesampleofcrediblescenarios. Another approach is to focus counter-terrorism resources on only the scenarios of greatest concern based on overall risk, potential consequence, likelihood, or related metrics. U.S. maritime security agencies appear to have followed policies consistent with one or the other of these approaches in federally-supported port security exercises and grant programs. Legislators often appear to focus attention on a small number of potentially catastrophic scenarios.

Clear perspectives on the nature and likelihood of specific types of maritime terrorist attacks are essential for prioritizing the nation’s maritime anti-terrorism activities. In practice, however, there has been considerable public debate about the likelihood of scenarios frequently given high priority by federal policy makers, such as nuclear or “dirty” bombs smuggled in shipping containers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker attacks, and attacks on passenger ferries. Differing priorities set by port officials, grant officials, and legislators lead to differing allocations of port security resources and levels of protection against specific types of attacks. How they ultimately relate to one another under a national maritime security strategy remains to be seen.

Maritime terrorist threats to the United States are varied, and so are the nation’s efforts to combat them. As oversight of the federal role in maritime security continues, Congress may raise questions concerning the relationship among the nation’s various maritime security activities, and the implications of differing protection priorities among them. Improved gathering and sharing of maritime terrorism intelligence may enhance consistency of policy and increase efficient deployment of maritime security resources. In addition, Congress may assess how the various elements of U.S. maritime security fit together in the nation’s overall strategy to protect the public from terrorist attacks.

Source: www.dtic.mil

I came across this in my surfing of the web and found this to be a good resource. You may want to take a look @ the paper in greater detail:

Future unknown: The terrorist threat to Australian maritime security

Summary of threats

Taking account of vulnerabilities and the relative impact of a successful attack, credible terrorist threats to Australia’s maritime security are:

• an attack on an Australian port, either by using a ship as a weapon or by causing an explosion on board a ship carrying hazardous or dangerous cargo
• the sinking of a vessel in a channel or at a berth
• an attack on the loading and storage facilities for hazardous or volatile materials
• an attack on ships transiting the Indonesian or Philippine archipelagos carrying trade to or from Australia
• an attack on an LNG carrier loading cargo at a northwestern Australian port
• a small-boat suicide attack against a high-value target such as a warship, cruise liner, ferry, chemical tanker or oil tanker alongside in an Australian port or moving within the port
• an attack against a cruise liner or passenger ferry, including a harbour ferry
  an attack on a warship, especially a US Navy vessel, alongside in an Australian port, or an RAN vessel in an overseas port
• mining or the threat of mining to close an entrance channel to an Australian port
• smuggling of weapons or equipment, perhaps including WMD, into an Australian port
• infiltration of terrorists and/or their materials into Australia by sea, either by clandestine landing or the use of fraudulent seafarer documentation.

Source: www.aspi.org.au

Interesting article asking the pertinent question: “Are the Ports Being Underfunded in the War on Terror?”

Layered approach to security

Security is a public-private responsibility. “We need to interact constructively with our sister ports, with U.S. Customs and with the companies developing security solutions,” notes George Cummings, director of homeland security at the Port of Los Angeles. “As port authorities, we have to help give the trade industry the opportunity to participate in the exploration of technologies that relate to security issues and to supply-chain and logistics issues. These technologies offer businesses the opportunity to achieve ROI.”

Where’s the beef?

One common mantra among port directors is how the lack of federal funding is undermining the security of their ports and cargoes. “There needs to be a dedicated pool of money exclusively for ports security,” says New Orleans’ LaGrange, past Chairman of the American Association of Ports.

Compounding the funding issue is the proposed structure of the granting program, essentially lumping all modes of transportation within a targeted ‘infrastructure protection program.’ “There is the concern of spreading the funds further and wider—back to the adage that freight doesn’t vote,” continues Nagle. “We need to have specific legislation and regulations geared to enhancing security on the maritime side—as it is on the aviation side.”

DHS Study finds Serious Security Lapses

A $75 million three-year study conducted by the Department of Homeland Security—to be fully completed in autumn 2006—has already found critical security lapses affecting U.S. seaports and the transportation distribution network, according to documents obtained by the Associated Press. The study—called ‘Operation Safe Commerce’—points to serious security oversights by personnel along the global transit supply chain, including port operators, private companies at foreign and U.S. ports, and operators of shipping lines, trains, trucks. These lapses could “enable un-manifested materials or weapons of mass destruction to be introduced into the supply chain,” the study reported.

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The Office of the Inspector General of the US Department of Justice recently released a report entitled: The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Protect the Nation’s Seaports. The report highlights overlapping jurisdiction issues between the USCG and FBI that could compromise the nation’s marine counterterrorism efforts.

Below is a brief excerpt:

“We found indications that the relationship between the FBI and the Coast Guard may already be strained,” says the report. “Early in 2005, as part of its efforts to develop its tactical response teams, Coast Guard and FBI officials met, and the Coast Guard requested further information on the selection criteria the FBI uses for SWAT teams and the HRT [Hostage Rescue Team]. The FBI responded to the Coast Guard’s written request by stating that that the FBI would not be able to assist the Coast Guard until the two agencies’ roles in responding to terrorist threats and incidents had been clearly defined and ‘are not competing for the same resources.’”

The report continues by noting that “The Coast Guard and the FBI also have different opinions about the level of cooperation between the two agencies at TOPOFF 3, a DHS-sponsored exercise to assess the nation’s capacity for preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks involving WMD. HRT representatives said the exercise showed the two agencies’ ability to respond in a coordinated fashion. The HRT took part in one of the incidents of the exercise, a scenario that called for the team to assault a 200-foot moving ferry off the coast of Connecticut. A boat and helicopters were used to transport the team to the ferry. The Coast Guard supported the HRT in the TOPOFF 3 exercise by providing search and rescue services. According to FBI officials, the Coast Guard could not participate in the boarding because it has a very limited capability to perform boardings when its boarding team faces armed resistance. FBI officials also noted that the Coast Guard does not train its personnel to board vessels that are underway.

“Coast Guard officials disagreed with the FBI’s analysis of TOPOFF 3, saying that the FBI guarded its territory as the lead federal agency for terrorism,” says the report. “One of the Coast Guard’s goals for TOPOFF 3 was to exercise its new tactical assault team, called an Enhanced Maritime Safety and Security Team. However, Coast Guard officials said the FBI repeatedly blocked the Coast Guard’s efforts, saying the FBI was the lead federal agency in the scenarios developed. The Coast Guard ultimately changed the scenario to circumvent the FBI’s lead federal agency role.”

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