The Anthrax Attacks and the History of Bio Warfare

ABSTRACT / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The anthrax attacks of 2001 were the first major instance of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack Post 9/11. These incidents demonstrated the efficiency, precision delivery capabilities and force multiplier effects of a WMD attack on one of our nation's critical infrastructure elements, the US Postal Service (USPS). In addition, the incidents highlighted the potential security flaws inherent in this and any other open system. This goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of the history of WMD usage, particularly Biological Weapons/Warfare (BW), a review of the anthrax terrorist attacks, and a critical assessment of the risks of future attacks.

THESIS / STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
While the WMD acronym CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive) is a product of the 20th Century industrialized war complex, the use of chemical, biological, and explosives has been around for centuries. The use of biological weapons has its roots in the mythical battle of Hercules and the Hydra. Upon defeating the Hydra, Hercules dipped his arrows in the Hydra's poisonous blood and used this "biological agent" to increase the lethality of his bow during battle.(Mayor, 2003)

During the Cold War, the development of CBRNE weapons numbers, technologies and variations proliferated at an alarming rate. The development of these weapons systems has significantly contributed to the size and breadth of the homeland security threat matrix today. In addition, the fall of the Eastern Bloc and the resulting dismantling of their CBRNE operations has served to decentralize expertise that had previously been held squarely in the hands of the two superpowers. The fragile economies and porous infrastructure security of the former Soviet Union states; the prevalence of widespread organized crime and black markets; and disbursement of related scientists and weapons experts has helped to ensure that the hopes of non-proliferation / containment of BW are fleeting dreams of the past. This has directly contributed to the heightened threat of WMD attacks in the future.

This paper will utilize the anthrax attacks of September and October 2001, as the basis for analyzing the current and future WMD threats and trends. These attacks are the most recent WMD attack in memory and burned an indelible reminder, into the hearts and minds of all Americans, about the catastrophic potential of a WMD attack. It has been over 20 years since The Day After aired on ABC, but the nightmares of WMD proliferation remain the same. What on god's earth possesses people to develop such sinister weapons? This paper will explore the history of BW's, will provide a critical review of the anthrax attacks, and will offer some suggested defense tactics against WMD's in a world filled with extremists willing to die for their cause.

What is a Biological Warfare Agent?
A biological warfare agent is a living microorganism or other organic toxin that causes fatal or incapacitating disease.(Tucker, 2001) BW often have longer incubation periods than chemical weapons (CW). They are often more potent than CW. They are often harder to control because they contain contagions that indiscriminately attack organic life, friend or foe.(White, 2004)

History of Biological Warfare
BW is a tactic that is almost as old as prostitution. The Greek myth of Hercules and Hydra was mentioned earlier in the paper, where Hercules utilized Hydra's blood to poison his arrows. Hannibal slung jars full of venomous snakes on his enemies decks during a naval battle against King Eumenes of Pergamum between 190 and 184 BC.(Dembek, 2004) The citizens of Hatra successfully defended their city in AD 198-199 by catapulting clay pots full of scorpions and other poisonous insects towards their Roman attackers.(Newman, 2005) There are even anthropological scholars who have suggested that attackers during Neolithic times tossed beehives into caves to flush out their enemies (Newman, 2005). This story has been repeated over-and-over throughout history, the bio agents and delivery methods may differ, but the tactic is the same. BW has been and will continue to be a highly effective tactic, especially as a tool of asymmetrical warfare.

Anthrax FAQ's
In order to fully comprehend the circumstances and severity of the anthrax attacks of 2001, it is important to provide some background about anthrax.

What is anthrax?
Anthrax is a serious infection caused by a tiny spore-forming bacterium called Bacillus anthracis.. Anthrax is naturally occurring disease that primarily affects agricultural regions, occurring mostly in livestock, in South and Central America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East, occasionally in the US. Humans, especially farm workers, can be affected by anthrax. (Oklahoma Biohazard Information Line, 2001)

	Source	Symptoms	Fatality Rate
Cutaneous (Skin)	95% via open wound	Skin infection within 1 - 2 days	20%, if left untreated
Intestinal	Consumption	Eating undercooked meat	25% - 60%
Inhalation	Breathing in airborne spores. Typically 8,000 to 10,000 spores	Initially similar to the common cold. Followed by acute breathing difficulties	80% - 95%
(Oklahoma Biohazard Information Line, 2001)

Can anthrax be spread from person-to-person?
Anthrax is not a contagion. It is almost always transmitted via direct exposure to the bacterium and almost never via a person-to-person contact.(Oklahoma Biohazard Information Line, 2001)

How do you kill anthrax spores?
Anthrax can be killed by sunshine, by bleach or by other disinfectants. Anthrax is in its most dangerous form when it is airborne, which lasts a maximum of a few hours. (Oklahoma Biohazard Information Line, 2001)

Can anthrax be used as a biological weapon?
Yes, anthrax can clearly be utilized as a biological weapon, as was evidenced during the anthrax attacks of 2001. The reality is that it is extremely difficult to manufacture and disburse a lethal anthrax aerosol without access to the most advanced biotechnology. Lethal aerosol anthrax requires an extremely dry powder and an optimally sized spore that is not too big, but not too small. In addition to the spore characteristics, atmospheric conditions, particularly humidity, must be optimal for transmission of the spores (Tucker, 1987).

How lethal is anthrax?
A nickels weight worth of anthrax equals 500,000,000 lethal doses (National Geographic, 2005). This is why anthrax has often been called "the poor man's atom bomb." However, the instability and delivery limitations of the agent have helped to ensure that this lethality has not already been fully leashed upon humanity.

How much risk is there of an anthrax attack?
Due to the difficulty in delivering the bacterium in an aerosol format, it is unlikely that anthrax will be used as BW agent to cause mass casualties by a terrorist organization. The manufacturing and delivery process are complex and require strict tolerances and it is unlikely, but not impossible, that a terrorist organization will gain these capabilities in the near future (Tucker, 1987).

Weaponization Process
Weaponization of a biological pathogen or toxin involves a number of stages. The overall weaponization process is similar, regardless of the agent chosen. The process involves the following:

Engineering an Antibiotic Resistant Strain
Drying and Milling Spores for Aerosol Optimization.
Extending the Agents Useful Life
Adding Anti-Clumping Agent to Promote Aersosolization (WGBH Science Unit, 2003)

Fortunately, standard anthrax spores are ill suited for weapons missions and the weaponization process is complex and tedious; creating a significant barrier to entry for any organization looking to use BW.

Anthrax Attacks
The first cases of bioterrorism anthrax-related attack occurred in September and October of 2001. At least four letters containing anthracis Bacillus spores, the bacteria that causes the disease commonly known as anthrax, were sent to news media personnel and two US Senators (See Appendix D for further details on handling suspicious packages). The letters were delivered via the US Mail and were linked to 22 cases of anthrax. 11 of the cases involved inhalation anthrax, the most lethal forms of the disease, and 11 were cutaneous (skin) anthrax, an easily treatable form of the disease with an aggressive antibiotic regimen. Nine of the 22 cases affected postal workers and two of the five individuals who died were postal workers.(GAO, 2004)

The US Postal Service responded to the crises by closing two heavily contaminated facilities, one in Hamilton, NJ and the other in Washington DC. Tests also revealed contamination at 21 other postal facilities, including 3 processing and distribution centers. (GAO, 2003)

The Hart Senate Office Building was closed for months following the incident and were decontaminated; in some cases with the poisonous gas chlorine dioxide gas to kill anthrax spores, in a process similar to fumigating a home for termites. (GAO, 2003)

There is strong evidence that the anthrax used in the attack was weaponized. The exact details of the anthrax spores is classified and for good reason. The information that was publicly available noted that the spores measured between one and a half and three microns and were treated with an anti-clumping type of chemical additive. It is clear that the spores were weaponized; they were originally manufactured by a sophisticated bio weapons laboratory, what is not clear is who sent them. The spores could have been released as a result of state-sponsored terrorist activities or they could have just as easily been stolen by some transnational terrorists and released at an opportune time. (Weiss and Eggen, 2001)

To date, no one has been charged with the anthrax attacks. There has been a great deal of suspicion and investigation of a former scientist from the US Army Medical Research Institute (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, previously the headquarters of the US biological warfare program and a repository for anthrax. The scientist, Steven J. Hatfill, has vehemently denied the charges and maintains his innocence (Morrison, 2002). The anthrax investigation is ongoing and its details remain classified.

As recently as March 15, 2004 the Department of Defense mail facilities were closed due to a biological alert that resulted in a temporary lockdown and closure of the facility. Fortunately, this anthrax scare proved to be a false alarm. However, the risk of anthrax ladened mail contaminating the mail system is still a reality. Policies and procedures have been developed and continue to be refined to handle these types of incidences, but they are clearly daunting and particularly inconvenient when the warnings are erroneous and the result of a faulty sensor or test. (Stockwell, Lengel, and Barbash, 2005).

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Hair Trigger
Module 3 - Religion and Middle East Terrorism made a clear distinction between religious extremist terrorism and political terrorism. White made a very distinctive differentiation in Chapter 4 of his book, noting that "religious terrorists are not constrained by the same factors that inhibit other types of terrorists."(White, 2004) He goes on to not that the value system of "holy terror" stands is diametrically opposed to "secular terror."

Secular terrorists would rather make allies than indiscriminately kill their enemies. Holy terrorists, however, are under no such constraints. They see the world as a battlefield between the forces of light and darkness. Winning is not described in political terms. The enemy must be totally destroyed. (White, 2004)

These characteristics make religious extremist terrorists exceedingly more dangerous than their political brethren, especially if they are in possession of WMD's.

Non-Proliferation
Foreign policy wonks in Washington and Moscow have relied on the doctrines of containment and non-proliferation to "ensure" that WMD's do not get into the wrong hands. Non-proliferation theory has traditionally focused creating treaties to limiting the number of states that possess WMD's; which include agreements to stop the production of these weapons, destroy the existing stockpiles of weapons and allow for the continued development of positive use of these technologies for the good of mankind. (Wedge, 1995)

This theory was executable when there were two superpowers who controlled the virtually all of the knowledge, materials, and equipment to develop WMD's. Today there are many nations beyond the former superpower nations that possess WMD's, including North Korea, Pakistan, India, and maybe even Iran.

In addition, non-proliferation theory assumes that those in possession of WMD's will act in a rational manner. The lessons from Module 3 clearly highlight the fact that religious fanatical terrorists are not rational actors. If the religious terrorists ever gain possession of substantial WMD's, there is no non-proliferation treaty that is going to be able to curb their thirst for violence and their lust to "win" at any cost.

Lone Wolf Scenario
From the limited information that is available about the anthrax attacks, it appears that these incidents may not be the result of transnational religious terrorism, but more likely are the product of a lone wolf. Module 1 focused upon the behaviors of terrorists and mentioned the lone wolf, as one of those scenarios. The lone wolf or "beserker" is a single individual who is consumed by the "cause," but does not utilize a network or a support organization to carry out terrorist activities (White, 2004).

Lone wolves tend to be more difficult to apprehend because they tend to keep to themselves. This is consitent with the old addage that "three people can keep a secret . . . if two of them are dead." The lone wolf does not have to worry about secrets leaking out of the organization because they are hypothetically the only ones that know what is going on. There were a number of other recent lone wolves who carried out sensational terrorist actions including: the Unabomber, the Olympic Bomber, the Oklahoma City Bomber and the DC Sniper. It took almost twenty years to crack the Unabomber Case, hopefully the anthrax case will be solved sooner.

Weaponized Anthrax: An Advanced BW
The one overarching issue that repeatedly comes up when researching the anthrax attacks is the difficulty in manufacturing, handling, and delivering weaponized anthrax. Even if someone were to have inauspiciously stolen the anthrax spores used in the attacks, they would have still needed to be reasonably sophisticated to even handle the agent. As noted earlier, inhalation anthrax is 80% to 95% lethal. Procuring and distributing weaponized anthrax spores requires expertise and it is likely that the authorities continue to focus upon BW experts as the prime suspects.

The Threat of Contagions
As mentioned earlier in the paper, anthrax is not a contagious bacterium, e.g. not passed through human-to-human contact. This makes the disbursement of anthrax to be far more controllable than some other bioweapons. This seems a bit ironic, given the fact that the last section noted the high degree of expertise needed to effectively deliver an anthrax attack. However, the reality is that because anthrax requires direct contact with the spore to create an infection, it makes it a more manageable bioagent.
Smallpox is a contagious agent whose infection pattern can not be readily predicted, once released. There is some evidence that smallpox could potentially be disseminated through the USPS. In fact, in 1901 two cases of smallpox were attributed to an infected letter and experts believe the same could be done today (Mitchell, 2005). The nation should be grateful that it was anthrax and not smallpox that was delivered.

Superbug
Beyond the horrors of antibiotic resistant bacteria, anti-venom resistant poisons and vaccination resistant viruses, lies the evil science and realities of synthetically developed supergerms.

In addition to the hybrid superbug noted above, bioweapons specialists are also working on variations of other diseases that present symptoms that that are inconsistent with conventional illnesses. The bioweapons scientists are essentially developing agents that are designed to outwit medical field's primary means of deciding on a course of treatment, the process of differential diagnosis. Their methods are calculated and highly effective, albeit sinister.

The range of possibilities of superbugs are only limited by the imaginations and ingenuity of the scientists conducting the research. This science of biowarfare is disturbing and appears to undermine ever intent of the Hippocratic Oath. The irony is that "most of the necessary materials and production equipment are 'dual use,' meaning that they have legitimate commercial applications as well as potential military uses." (WGBH Science Unit, 2001)

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, and CONCLUSIONS
The use of bioweapons, whether a beehive or superbug, is as old as prostitution. The fact is that weapons available today are far more virulent and toxic, although probably no more panic inducing.

This paper has thus far covered the history of BW and reviewed the anthrax attacks, but as of yet it has not provided any suggested defense tactics against BW. This question of developing the appropriate defensive tactics is one that the nation's military, agencies, universities and citizens will all play a role in crafting for the foreseeable future. There is no single answer to this question because of the pervasive and catastrophic risk posed by BW. The list provided below can serve as the foundation for creating a strategy, but it is by no means complete.

WORKS CITED
Dembek, Zygmunt. (2004). "Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World - Book Review." Naval War College. (Online). 05/01/05.
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2004/Spring/br10-sp04.htm

GAO. (2004). "US Postal Service - Better Guidance Is Needed to Sensure an Appropriate Response to Anthrax Contamination." (Online). 05/01/05.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-239

Heyman, David. (2002). "Lessons from the Anthrax Attacks." Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. (Online). 4/30/05
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/dtra02.pdf

Newman, Cathy. (May 2005). "Pick Your Poison." National Geographic.
Oklahoma Biohazard Information Line. (2001). "Anthrax Frequently Asked Questions." (Online). 5/01/05.
http://www.mipt.org/anthraxfaq.asp

Stockwell, Jamie, Lengel, Allan, and Barbash, Fred. (2005). "Mail Facilities Remain Closed After Alerts." The Washington Post. (Online). 05/03/05
http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com/wp050315.html

White, J.R. (2003). Terrorism: An Introduction. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning.