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The Madrid Train Bombing and the Emergence
of Al Qaeda 2.0 Author:
Jonathan B. Smith Michigan
State University 's School of Criminal Justice THESIS: The Madrid Train Bombing of March 11, 2004 that killed 170 people and almost single handedly altered the history of Spanish politics produced aftershocks that continue to be felt by the international counter-terrorism community today; posing a potentially more chilling effect than the events of 9/11. March 11, 2004 was exactly two and a half years after the 9/11 incidents and demonstrated a marked increase in Al Qaeda's sophistication, global reach and lethality. This case study will offer an in depth review and analysis of the events of March 11, 2004; and their implications on the proliferation and future prospects of terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts in the Global War on Terrorism(GWOT). TOPIC INTRODUCTION: Key Issues There are three key issues that are going to be explored in detail throughout this case study. They include the following concepts:
The following section will provide detailed overviews and analyses of each of these key issues. Significance Political Implications The ruling conservative Popular Party of Spain had been leading in the upcoming Presidential polls by four and a half points prior to the attack, a seemingly insurmountable margin with less then three days until the election. Sixty hours after the attacks, 35 million people went to the polls (8% more than predicted) and the Socialist party won the election over the incumbent Popular Party(Wright, 2004). The events of March 11, 2004 directly swayed the results of the Spanish presidential election. Al Qaeda had successfully implemented and executed a political strategy to promote jihad. Che Guevara would have been proud - Al Qaeda was utilizing guerilla warfare tactics to achieve its mission, not just the terrorist tactics of the past. There was an even more chilling aspect of these bombings, a 42 page manifesto called "Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers" had been posted on the Internet long before the actual attacks. The event had been premeditated, albeit not completely scripted. Below is a short excerpt from the article:
The political ramifications of this event are bone chilling, especially in light of the calculated nature of the event. Force Multiplier Effects There were a number of force multiplier effects that intensified the success and helped the "operatives" to remain undetected: Leaderless Resistance - Following the invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda lost its base of operations. In a traditional sense, this "decapitation strike," as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described the operation, should have led to the rapid defeat and surrender of the enemy. Unfortunately like the mythical Hydra, Al Qaeda seems to have grown a new head. However, that head is not centralized, like a traditional state run hierarchy. In fact, the Al Qaeda organization today looks more like an all channels matrix organization, described by Arquilla and Ronfeldt in The Advent of Netwar. Everybody in the Al Qaeda network is loosely connected to everyone else, in this case primarily via the Internet channel. The operatives in Madrid were operating quasi-independently, but maintained the same shared values and objectives regarding global jihad as their Al Qaeda brethren. This organization structure makes it exceedingly more difficult to track and catch the terrorists, giving them a significant advantage of stealth and operational flexibility. New Alliances - The events of March 13, 2004 were carried out by an alliance of terrorists, criminals and radicals. These group included veterans of the Al Qaeda training camps who provided explosives expertise; drug dealers who help finance the operations; and radical religious extremists who served as the catalyst for organizing the operations (Johnson, 2004). Al Qaeda's operations are no longer limited to hardened Al Qaeda terror camp veterans; in fact Al Qaeda's membership profile has morphed since the invasion of Afghanistan to include:
The evolution of the organization has complicated the GWOT because traditional paradigms and crime fighting methodologies are no longer valid. C4ISR - Beyond the force multiplier effects of leaderless resistance and new found alliances, Al Qaeda has also learned to utilize the inherent command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities offered by modern computer technology. Historically C4ISR has been the sole domain of Western militaries. However, today many of these technologies are cost effective and commercially available off the shelf. These technologies include email, fax, mobile communications, virtual meeting capabilities, chat boards, distributed project management and coordination tools. The proliferation of these technologies have arguably been more useful to terrorist organizations than the US military because of their widespread availability and ease of use. They offer organizations a means of conducting a global command and control operation, in real time, with a significant degree of security (Tibbetts, 2002). C4ISR computer technology was a key component of the Madrid bombings for cyberplanning, detonation via mobile phones and the propaganda that followed the incident. Far Enemy In addition to the political
implications and the force multiplier effects, the Madrid bombing marked
another incidence where Al Qaeda was able to successfully attack the "far
enemy" in their pursuit of jihad. The far enemy in this case is defined
as Western nations, who have historically helped to support the "near
enemy" or Middle Eastern monarchies. (Sageman, 2004) According to
Florintino Portero, a Spanish political analyst: The successful attack and subsequent regime change in Spain appreciably added to Al Qaeda's confidence and myth among Islamists, it is a David vs. Goliath tale heard daily throughout the Muslim world. BACKGROUND In the interest of time and space the background section provides more of an overview of the incident, rather than a blow-by-blow description of the events and perpetrators. Overview of the Incident On March 13, 2004, less then three days before the Spanish presidential election, 13 back packs loaded with dynamite and cell phone detonators were detonated on crowded commuter trains in Madrid. The incident was planned by a hodgepodge group of veteran Al Qaeda soldiers, criminals and religious extremists. One hundred and seventy people died and the ruling Popular Party lost an election they were expected to easily win only minutes before the bombs exploded. The newly elected Socialist Party subsequently withdrew Spain's troops from Iraq and the rest is history. Al Qaeda had executed its first successful political campaign and achieved their objective of "scaring" the Spaniards out of Iraq. (Johnson, 2005) ANALYSIS Goals The Significance section above, details many of the motivations and critical factors contemplated and achieved. In summary, this event represented another significant Al Qaeda "military operation" against the '"far enemy" that was an unqualified success in their minds. It flawlessly achieved their objectives of:
It further proved that Al Qaeda is a potent, violent and resourceful enemy. "Rumors of Al Qaeda's death had been greatly exaggerated." Response Within a short period of time, Spanish authorities were hot on the trail of the operatives. They ultimately were able to track the perpetrators, based upon a mobile phone code in one of the backpacks that failed to detonate. (Johnson 2005) The terrorists chose to commit suicide rather than surrender to authorities and face a tribunal. More significantly and potentially disturbing was the Spanish authorities' willingness to capitulate to the terrorists wishes and withdraw their troops from Iraq. This type of political cowardice in the face of a highly adaptable and unpredictable enemy demonstrates great weakness. CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS Al Qaeda has proven to be an adaptive, intelligent and worthy opponent. The Madrid bombings represented a win on the Al Qaeda side of the score card. However, this was only a small battle and this should not discourage the resolve of Western nations. Al Qaeda is utilizing an all
channels leaderless resistance network as its means of organization. This
structure has historically proven to be very effective against hierarchical
organizations such as Western governments, militaries and law enforcement.
The West needs to change its tactics and expectations.
The GWOT is not going to be won with GPS guided cruise missiles, it is going to be won with more basic military and law enforcement tactics involving intelligence(INT), human intelligence(HUMINT), psychological operations(PSYOPS) and old fashioned grit. The future of warfare remains battlefield, even if it has no front, and in the hearts of the combatants; not on an analysts computer screen, as was erroneously predicted during Desert Storm. The US has fought similar network-centric wars in the past and won. During WWII the German U-boats posed a terrific threat to US fleet and supply operations. Through a combination of commitment, intelligence, cunning, guile and luck, the US was able to break the Enigma code and the Nazi's strategic U-boat stranglehold on the Northern Atlantic. (Friedman, 2003) The Madrid train bombing is
just a prelude of future engagements to come. Western militaries need
to learn to adapt their strategies and tactics to this new battlefield,
just as are forefathers did during the Revolutionary War. Victory is within
grasp, but the actors need to be willing to take risk, accept casualties
and to operate in a networked fashion. Independent thinking and ingenuity
in military and law enforcement needs to be embraced, not punished. The
greatest threat to the Western World's way of life is its existing high
quality of life, recent history of relative peace, and fear of losing
the status quo. If the hierarchical status quo is maintained, failure
is virtually guaranteed. Now is a time where there is a distinct need
for courageous leadership, great statesmanship and selfless sacrifice
in defense of the Western way of life. References Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David. (2001).
Networks and Netwars: Bergen, Peter. (2004). Al Qaeda 2.O. (Online),
2/20/04. Friedman, Norman, (April 2004). Information Warfare Can Defeat Terrorists. US Naval Institute, Proceedings. (Online). 2/20/04. ProQuest. Gaudin, Sharon, (November 26, 2001), The Terrorist Network. Network World. (Online). 2/20/04. ProQuest. Johnson, Keith. (February 14, 2005). Terrorists
Join Forces As Cells Shift Tactics. (Online), 2/20/04. The Wall Street
Journal. Kladko, Brian. (October 12, 2004).Chat rooms may be meeting places for terrorists, researchers believe. Knight Ridder Tribune Business News. (Online), 2/20/04. ProQuest. McGraw Hill, (November 22, 2002). Al Qaeda Uses Secure Links to Track US Troops in Combat. Aviation Week and Space Technology. (Online), 2/20/04. ProQuest. Pressman, Jeremy, (December 2003), Leaderless Resistance: The Next Threat. Current History. (Online), 2/20/04. ProQuest. Sagemen, Marc. (November 1, 2004). Understanding
Terror Networks. (Online), 2/20/04. Snider, Michael. (November 15, 2004). On Osama's Trail. Maclean's. (Online), 2/20/04. ProQuest. Thomas, Timothy L. (2003). Al Qaeda and the
Internet: The Danger of "Cyberplanning." (Online), 2/20/04. Tibbetts, Lt Col Patrick S., (2002) Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies. (Online), 2/20/04. StormingMedia White, J.R. (2003). Terrorism: An Introduction. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning. Wright, Lawrence. (August 2, 2004). The Terror Web. The New Yorker. (Online), 2/20/04. ProQuest. DEFINITIONS Force Multiplier Effect: "Terroris use force multipliers to increase their attacking power. Force multipliers include technology, transnational support, media coverage, and religious fanaticism." (White, 2003)
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