The theme of a tiered defense plan help transition nicely into the next article published by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) describing their conceptual Waterborne Ship Protective System (WSPS). The WSPS is specifically designed to protect RAN ships, a force protection application, while anchored or moored in port. The RAN's created a number of very detailed specifications for the WSPS, including the fact that it must be:

In addition to the specific mission details of the WSPS, the report includes some great details about the practical operation of the system. One of the most prescient points that the report makes, which is consistent with NAVFAC, is that:

Layered defense is not the only major issue for the WSPS; the system must also be as non-intrusive as possible during times of low alert. Interaction with the public is a major concern for the RAN and the system must be flexible enough that it has minimal impact on civilian or commercial traffic and is aesthetically pleasing. These are not necessarily issues that a naval officer would consider at first glance, but they are crucial to maintaining good community relations and support for the RAN's efforts. The RAN's sensitivity to community relations is further evidence that effective homeland security measures require the cooperation and support of the public, government and university communities as was discussed throughout the course.

Seaports represent a major element of critical infrastructure where private and local, state and federal interests and policies intersect. In "Reducing the Risk of Terror Events at Seaports," Willard Price examines the probability of terror events, efforts taken to mitigate the risk and potential inactions that may leave them vulnerable. Price provides a comprehensive overview of the seaports major driving forces, including economic and political motivation. He also provides a very in depth look into the mind and motivations of terrorists; the bottom line is that they will seek the path of least resistance with greatest political and economic impact. Seaports offer an opportune target for terrorists because of their vast size, accessibility, general metropolitan location, fuzziness of cargo manifests, and access to transportation links from across the globe. It is clear that seaports are a ripe target and are certainly going to be subject to future terror efforts.

Willard notes that one of the most difficult public policy issues facing maritime port security are the vast number of stakeholders involved making any decision relating to the port extremely complex. Port security is a critical element of homeland security that impacts the nation, but much of the security is implemented at the local level by port authorities and private concerns. One of the most difficult tasks under this structure is determining who should pay for the additional security required, as a result of the heightened terrorist risk. Stephen Flynn discussed "The Tragedy of the Commons" in his book America the Vulnerable; seaports are a prime example of this concept in action. Private operators and port authorities need to weigh the risk of a terror event against the cost of increased user fees or lower profits. (Flynn, 2004); Unless regulated to implement the security measures, it is likely that private industries and port authorities will err on the side of fewer security measures and higher profits, at least in the short term. The costs of upgrading port security are daunting and will most likely require a combination of public and private funds to support the initiative, until then ports will remain an attractive target for terrorism.

Stephen Flynn has been one of the loudest critics of the current state of port security. In his written testimony entitled "The Ongoing Neglect of Maritime Transportation Security," he continues to criticize the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security. He notes that prior to 9/11 border security was not seen as a matter of national security and was a largely neglected public policy. Flynn states that investment in aviation security has outpaced maritime security by a factor of 9:1, even though the potential risk of harm from a maritime attack outweighs an aviation disaster. In addition, the Transportation Safety Administration has failed to develop a comprehensive plan to protect maritime security. He also noted that:

All of these scenarios are highly probable and pose a significant risk to maritime security. The U.S.S. Cole was attacked while in port in Yemen, killing 17 U.S. service men. The French oil tanker Limberg was attacked off the coast of Yemen in 2002, damaging the ship and causing an oil spill.

Fritelli goes on further to describe the issue of funding port security. He notes that the unresolved debate regarding funding is hindering efforts to improve port security. This issue is likely to be a political hot potato for years to come. Allocating the resources that have been appropriated has proven to be an ever further complicating factor and highly politicized process. At the end of the day after all of the political wrangling is over in Washington, a system needs to be developed to raise port security to an acceptable level, while minimizing the economic impact and inconvenience of the measures. This is going to require a substantial financial commitment and public/private cooperation to successfully implement and execute.

The final article focuses upon one of the "Other Littoral Based Critical Infrastructures." The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security wrote an article on the risks of the increased demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) vis-à-vis port security. LNG is a highly volatile substance that offers a readily available explosive agent to an enterprising terrorist. The US Department of Energy expects LNG to account for 15% of the U.S. natural gas consumption by 2025, today it is only 1%.(Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2004) James Fay, a professor emeritus of mechanical engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology noted:

An attack on a LNG tanker docked in port is just one of the many types of attack that could occur to an element of the littoral based critical infrastructure. With an asset so potentially volatile, it would be prudent to utilize NAVFAC's threat mitigation methodology and implement a comprehensive waterside port security strategy because the stakes are just too high.

The methodologies and strategies for implementing maritime security are generally fairly consistent, whether protecting a navy vessel, a port facility or an LNG tanker. Littoral critical infrastructure protection is key element of the homeland security solution and it needs to be given a high degree of priority.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS and FINDINGS
Based upon reviewing the aforementioned literature and many more items that were not included in the review, there is a clear set of major issues that need to be recognized and addressed in an effort to improve waterside critical infrastructure security. These critical issues include:

Ultimately ports need to try and walk a fine line of the implementing an appropriate amount of security to thwart an attack, while minimizing the economic impacts. As Fritelli noted, "a harbor without ships is safe, but that is not what harbors are built for."

The current port security regulations are a work in progress. They represent the best efforts of planners and community to date. In order for ports to avoid the perils of the tragedy of the commons a national set of consistent security regulations needs to be implemented and enforced. Without the benefit of the regulation ports will tend to rush toward the freedom of the commons; which will ultimately lead to serious consequences potentially undermining the entire system of global trade.

Given the confluence of competing and conflicting interests in the port arena it would be easy to ignore the need for additional security and take the ostrich approach. Prior to the U.S.S. Cole incident and 9/11 it was acceptable to implement port security and force protection measures on a reactive basis. The perceived threat was so low that the risks were considered acceptable. However, following these events, the risks became far clearer and more probable and a purely defensive and reactive approach is no longer an acceptable means of protection. Today, port security and force protection must be thoroughly considered before an attack occurs and must be proactively implemented.

The port security and force protection landscape has certainly changed in the last five years. They are elements of our homeland security and defense plans that are imperative to the security of the nation. Their budgets need to be consistently funded; their stakeholders need to be on board; their plans need to balance the importance of security and commerce; their standards need to be implemented to ensure consistent security; and their plans need to be implemented proactively as opposed to reactively, as in the past. Port security and force protection are key elements of the nation's national security plan and will continue to develop and evolve as long as the War on Terror persists.

DISCUSSION and RECOMMENDATIONS
Maritime port security and force protection are elements of homeland security and defense that are in their infancy. The maritime security community was given a wake up call on 9/11. There is still a lot of work to be done and research to be accomplished.

The technology for maritime port security is in its infancy. Originally this paper was intended to focus upon the benefits of implementing maritime port security barriers, but the amount of academic research was too thin to support the topic. Maritime port security barriers are a critical element of any port security or force protection plan, but more research and empirical testing needs to be done before a standard can be developed for the technology. NAVFAC and the RAN laid out some pretty clear needs and wants for the technology, but the technology will require years of actual practical use and innovation before an optimal specification and solution is established.

In Module 9: Special Topics in Homeland Security, the course discussed the importance of technology and research issues and the contribution of public, private and academic resources. Based upon the current state of maritime port security, it is clear that the discipline will benefit from the cooperation of the research and development capabilities of government labs, university academics and the ingenuity of private entrepreneurship. Based upon the historical innovations developed by the military industrial complex over the past 80 years, it is safe to assume that the cooperative efforts will produce an amazing solution to the very perplexing dilemmas facing littoral based critical infrastructure today.

The port security strategies and methodologies that are developed today out of the research and development efforts will become the standards of tomorrow. This discipline is in its infancy and the achievements that are made today will have a lasting impact upon the nation's critical infrastructure. Just as President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954 dramatically changed the complexion of the nation's highway system and ultimately it created unprecedented economic development, the homeland security and defense strategies developed today will pay dividends for generations to come.

General Eisenhower was one of the great war heroes of WWII. During WWII the American war machine produced astounding achievements, unparalleled in history. Part of the success was certainly achieved through the aforementioned development of a public / private / university partnerships, but there was more to the success than a mere partnership. Americans across the globe were singularly focused upon protecting their way of life and extinguishing the rise and growth of fascism. Further research needs to be done on this issue. It is clear that if the nation could rally the same level of global commitment and support against terrorism that was bolstered against fascism, the war could be won decisively.

Besides enlisting the support of the nation and the globe in the War on Terrorism, it is critical that the nation utilizes its unique entrepreneurial capabilities in creating a solution to the maritime security problems and other homeland security issues. More research should be focused upon Edison's philosophy of innovation. As Edison learned prototyping allows you to learn from risks almost immediately. It teaches the user more about the performance range of the product than a thousand hours thinking about the solution. It is very easy to get bogged down in the red tape associated with maritime homeland security, but it is important that the focus remains on the solution and not the bureaucracy.