This guide was developed to assist dam owners and operators in understanding the possible need for waterside barriers as part of their overall security plan. It provides them and security personnel with a very cursory level of information on barriers and their use, maintenance, and effectiveness—elements that must be carefully taken into account when selecting waterside barriers. The waterside barriers described here are systems or technologies designed to protect critical assets from attack by swimmers or the water-borne vessels commonly found on rivers or reservoirs.

The threat scenarios evaluated in the site vulnerability assessment form the basis for determining if a surface or subsurface barrier technology or barrier system is necessary.The interdiction and use of force policies associated with the use of waterside barriers must also be assessed and resolved as part of the security  plan. Considerations that influence the barrier  technology or barrier system selection in addition to their effectiveness include purchase, installation, maintenance, and replacement costs related to the sites specific environment and the training and staffing of site security forces.

Source: www.usni.org

Source: www.dhs.gov

Background

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recognizes the need to address the threats that small vessels pose to the United States. Small vessels are categorized as any watercraft of less than 300 gross tons and used for recreational or commercial purposes, regardless of method of propulsion. Small vessels include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, and any other personal or commercial vessels involved in U.S. or foreign voyages. With 95,000 miles of shoreline, 300,000 square miles of waterways, 360 ports of call, 12,000 marinas, and an estimated 17 million small vessels presently operating in U.S. waters, it is extremely difficult to distinguish friend from foe.

DHS has identified four scenarios of gravest concern regarding the potential use of small vessels in terrorist-related activities: using a small vessel (1) as a waterborne improvised explosive device, (2) to smuggle weapons (including weapons of mass destruction) into the United States, (3) to smuggle terrorists into the United States, and (4) as a waterborne platform for conducting an attack.

These four scenarios are based on terrorist acts that have involved small vessels. For example, in October 2000, Al-Qaeda attacked the USS Cole by navigating an explosive-laden small boat alongside the destroyer as it was refueling pier side at the port of Aden in Yemen. Seventeen U.S. Navy sailors were killed in the explosion.

The USS Cole with a large hole in her left side after being struck by an Al-Qaeda waterborne improvised explosive device.

In October 2002, Al-Qaeda directed an attack by an explosive- laden small boat against the French oil tanker M/V Limburg off the coast of Yemen. The attack resulted in a large oil spill and fires on board the tanker, and killed one and injured four crew members.

In a recent surge of international piracy, terrorists have used small vessels to hijack cruise ships, tankers, and other vessels. In 2007, 206 acts of piracy were committed, and 76 others attempted. In September 2008, Somali pirates used three small vessels to surround and seize the MV Faina, which was carrying 33 Russian T-72 tanks and other weapons and ammunition. The captain of the vessel died during the assault, and the pirates demanded $35 million for the release of the ship and the crew.

In November 2008, terrorists hijacked a Pakistani fishing boat, killing the captain and crew. The terrorists then sailed the boat to Mumbai, India, where they went ashore in small inflatable boats and carried out an attack that killed more than 170 people and held India’s financial capital hostage for 3 days.

As these events demonstrate, the threat posed by terrorists operating small vessels is daunting.

In June 2007, the DHS National Small Vessel Security Summit, held in Arlington, Virginia, brought together approximately 300 small vessel maritime stakeholders and top federal, state, and local government officials to share concerns about small vessel operations, safety, and security. Using recommendations from the National Summit, risk management principles, and previous U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) analyses of small vessel threats, a DHS working group developed the Small Vessel Security Strategy, which DHS published in April 2008, to address the risks of small vessels to national security.

The overall objective of the Small Vessel Security Strategy is to close security gaps and enhance the small vessel security environment. The Strategy lists four major goals for achieving small vessel security:

Findings

Overall, the department has made progress, but more remains to be done to provide effective guidance and operate effective programs to address small vessel threats. The Strategy addresses two desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy as it defines the problem, and uses risk assessments to analyze the threats. However, the Strategy only partially addresses the remaining four characteristics. It partially addresses elements such as strategic priorities and milestones, and roles and responsibilities of state and local sectors, but it does not address performance measures, associated costs or human capital, or accountability and oversight frameworks.

Additionally, critical programs intended to support small vessel security may not be operating effectively. Although the department recognizes the need to raise public awareness and take action to mitigate the risk of small vessel threats, its approach was hindered because its components are not fully integrated. As a result, the nation’s ports, waterways, and maritime borders remain vulnerable to small vessel threats. The department partially concurred with our recommendation that it address the missing elements in its strategy. The department nonconcurred with our recommendation that it evaluate the effectiveness of the programs it intends to use to meet the strategy’s goals.

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