Source: www.ensec.org

Terrorists learning from pirates to operate in the maritime realm

Terrorist groups operating in the maritime realm is not a new concern; several terrorist organizations have—or have had—well-developed abilities to attack targets at sea. In addition to al-Qa’ida’s previously mentioned attacks on the USS Cole, the M/V Limburg, and the USS Firebolt, Abu Sayaaf in the Philippines is responsible for the largest maritime terrorist event ever to have occurred: the 2004 bomb attack on SuperFerry 14, which killed over 100 people. And the (currently non-operational) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launched several successful suicide missions against maritime targets from their bases in Sri Lanka.

Not all terrorist groups have mastered maritime operations, but many currently seek to do so, in parts of the world that have been relatively free of maritime terrorist activity. Of the greatest concern is Somalia and the impact this could have on shipping in the region if terrorist attacks on vessels were to occur more frequently. Additionally important are recent activities of splinter groups associated with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. For example, in 2008 militants from the Niger Delta region attacked the MT Meredith, a tanker carrying 4,000 tons of diesel fuel, and kidnapped a Romanian crew-member (released a day later). The militants, believed to be associated with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), succeeded in dynamiting the ship’s engine and severely disabling the vessel. While the MEND and other related “copycat” groups have been known to attack and blow up oil pipelines, this was the first time such an attack has occurred at sea and may portend an increasing concern for the future.

Finally, the July 2010 attack on the Japanese-owned VLCC (very large crude carrier) M Star in the Strait of Hormuz is a worrisome development for the world’s critical energy trade. The damage to the tanker—believed to be caused by “homemade explosives” aboard a dinghy [small boat attack / small boat threat] —was not considered serious, but the news instantly fanned worries about shipping security, as it was the first attack of its kind in the critically strategic strait. Responsibility for what they called a “suicide attack” was claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an al-Qa’ida affiliated group.

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The final scene in Syriana portrays a disaffected youth in the Middle East choosing Jihad.

This scene highlights the need for maritime security zones and floating security barriers to protect high value critical infrastructure from a small boat terrorist attack utilizing an Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

By Gal Luft

Source: www.politico.com

Oil Site Guards Blast Car Bombers

By HASAN JAMALI, Associated Press Writer

ABQAIQ, Saudi Arabia – Suicide bombers in explosives-laden cars attacked the world’s largest oil processing facility Friday, but were prevented from breaking through the gates when guards opened fire on them, causing the vehicles to explode, officials said.

The Saudi oil minister said the blast “did not affect operations” at the Abqaiq facility, denying an earlier report on Al-Arabiya television that the flow of oil was halted briefly after a pipeline was damaged.

The facility “continued to operate normally. Export operations continued in full,” the minister, Ali Naimi, said in a statement.

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Exceprt from Terrorism Monitor “Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda’s Next Target?”

Former CIA agent Robert Baer has considered the implications of terrorist
attacks on Saudi oil facilities, writing, “At the least, a moderate-to-severe attack on Abqaiq would slow average production there from 6.8 million barrels a day to roughly a million barrels for the first two months post-attack, a loss equivalent to approximately one-third of America’s current daily consumption of crude oil. Even as long as seven months after an attack, Abqaiq output would still be about 40 percent of pre-attack output, as much as four million barrels below normal—roughly equal to what all of the OPEC partners collectively took out of production during the devastating 1973 embargo” (see Robert Baer’s Sleeping with the Devil : How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude).

By John C.K. Daly (from Terrorism Monitor, February 23)

At a time of record-high oil prices, analysts are beginning to consider the implications of possible terrorist attacks on Middle Eastern oil facilities. The crown jewel of these facilities is Saudi Arabia’s oil production infrastructure. It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia possesses 261.9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves . . .

Terrorist attacks could be easily launched against onshore facilities and tankers. Over 60 percent of the world’s oil is shipped on 3,500 tankers through a small number of “chokepoints” including the Strait of Hormuz, which alone transits 13 million barrels of oil per day.

Al-Qaeda has already carried out maritime attacks on both warships and tankers. On October 6, 2002, the 299,364 DWT-ton French Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) tanker Limburg, carrying a cargo of 397,000 barrels of crude from Iran to Malaysia, was rammed by an explosives-laden boat off the port of Ash Shihr at Mukalla, 353 miles east of Aden. A crewman was killed and the double-hulled tanker was breached. The impact on the Yemeni economy was immediate, as maritime insurers tripled their rates . . .

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Blog Tags: Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, Force Protection, Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Port Security

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