The threat of terrorism resides at the nexus of intent and capability. In judging whether terrorists are likely to strike a particular target, we consider whether a successful strike will fulfill their intent but also whether executing a successful strike is within their capabilities. The attacks on September 11th showed the jihadists movement intent to attack the United States. It also demonstrated the kind of capabilities they can achieve in order to carry out their intent. Planning and reconnaissance phases lasted years. The attackers learned how to fly and how to engage in close quarter combat. They used these capabilities to hijack aircraft and turn them into guided missiles. Given the stated intent from al Qaeda and affiliated organizations to cause this level of destruction again, we should assume that they are looking for other opportunities to use our own infrastructure against us.

Intent

Jihadist groups including al Qaeda and affiliated organizations have articulated goals including:

A successful attack on an LNG tanker could fulfill all these intentions. Transporting large quantities of this hazardous substance through inland waterways to urban terminals presents the sort of target that could kill large numbers of American citizens, destroy our economic centers, and eliminate critical assets for importing energy. As our Providence report concluded, a precisely timed assault against a slow moving LNG carrier transiting within close proximity to densely populated areas could cause death and destruction far greater than 9/11. In addition, it could bring global trade to a halt for a prolonged period of time and deprive us of a growing source of energy for both power generation and wintertime heat.

Capabilities

Al Qaeda and related groups have demonstrated an ability to operate undetected in the US. Even since 9-11, terrorist groups have maintained a presence in the US despite our attempts to expose them. A 2005 report indicated that the FBI has over 1000 Full Field Investigations underway against al Qaeda alone. Our border control efforts do little to deter illegal crossing into the United States, which continues to be a commonplace activity.

Weapons and other capabilities needed to conduct an attack on an LNG carrier can be readily obtained in the US, according to US Government reports. A variety of boats and scuba gear can be easily procured. General Aviation aircraft can easily be rented or stolen at numerous small airports throughout the United States. Explosives are readily available, both fertilizer based weapons, which can be procured without a license, and commercial explosives, which are frequently stolen and sold on the black market. Large caliber rockets can be obtained on the international gray arms market. Few containers entering the United States are inspected by US Customs and can deliver shipments of nefarious goods and materials needed to complete any mission.

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The final scene in Syriana portrays a disaffected youth in the Middle East choosing Jihad.

This scene highlights the need for maritime security zones and floating security barriers to protect high value critical infrastructure from a small boat terrorist attack utilizing an Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

Source: www.lngfacts.org

The LNG Industry provides the appropriate security, planning, prevention and mitigation in close coordination with local, state, and federal authorities, including the United States Coast Guard. These measures significantly reduce risks from intentional events such as terrorist attacks.

The U.S. Coast Guard determines the suitability of a waterway to transport LNG safely; creates safety and security rules for each specific port; works with terminal and ship operators and host port authorities to ensure that policies and procedures conform to required standards; and works with operators to conduct emergency response drills; has the authority to receive background checks of crews; conducts ship searches; and requires the use of Sea Marshals (specially trained and armed U.S. Coast Guard personnel).Companies tightly control access to facilities through gated security and continuous surveillance monitoring. All personnel undergo identity and background checks. Supplies and equipment are inspected before entering facilities.

Federal regulations authorize safety zones to safeguard carriers, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities. These zones are determined on a case-by-case basis as part of a facility security plan to minimize vulnerability. The regulations requiring exclusion zones around LNG facilities ensure people and property are protected.

Risks resulting from intentional events such as terrorist attacks, can be greatly reduced with the appropriate security, planning, mitigation, and prevention. The LNG industry has these precautions in place.

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“The biggest fear I have is the ramming like that of the [USS] Cole,” Former White House counterterrorism chief Richard A. Clarke said, adding that the 2002 al-Qaida attack could have been prevented by a floating security barrier.

Natural gas imported – at a risk

By Kevin G. Hall
Inquirer Washington Bureau

. . . Expansion, construction or study of a liquefied-natural-gas terminal is going on in at least 40 places along the three U.S. coastlines. Imports are expected to double by 2023.

That makes the Coast Guard think about the threat of terrorism. “We’re reevaluating our security posture with LNG tanker arrivals, and looking at what risk-mitigation strategies are most appropriate,” said Cmdr. John Cushing, the chief of the Coast Guard’s vessel and facilities operating standards division in Washington. “How many boats do we need to escort these vessels into port?… There is certainly a workload associated with the number of escorts that we’d need to do.”

A Department of Energy report in December 2004 concluded that transporting liquefied natural gas has terrorism risks, ranging from deadly fireballs to vapor clouds that could burn back to the source from as far away as a mile. In liquid form, natural gas is highly combustible, burning hotter than oil or gasoline.

The government study suggested that a pleasure boat loaded with explosives, such as the one that damaged the destroyer USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, might not penetrate the double hull of a liquefied-natural-gas tanker. Instead, researchers saw bigger threats from hijackers, who could crash a tanker to release a combustible vapor cloud.

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Resources:

• LNG Security
• Documents Relating to Liquefied Natural Gas
• LNG Facilities